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SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING STANDARDS FOR GUARDIANS: 
THEORY AND REALITY 
 
Linda S. Whitton* & Lawrence A. Frolik** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Decisions—we make them every day—hundreds of them in fact, some 
deliberately, others reflexively. We carefully choose what movie to see, but put 
little conscious effort into choosing the route to the office. Although even routine 
decisions require a choice between alternatives (for example, taking the 
expressway or the secondary roads, the stairs or the elevator) the brain uses past 
experiences—working memory—to reach such decisions with minimum cognitive 
effort.1 
Decisions that require conscious deliberation are another matter. Economists 
generally explain deliberate decision making by the expected utility theory. 
According to this theory, a decision is a function of the expected utility of an 
outcome and the probability of that outcome.2 Psychologists, however, criticize 
expected utility theory as too rational and idealistic, arguing that decision makers 
rarely have complete information upon which to base a decision or the means to 
accurately predict the outcome.3 
Psychologists instead focus on the cognitive factors that form a reference 
point for decisions by “framing” the alternatives. These factors include cognitive 
biases shaped by past experiences,4 current emotions and beliefs,5 and the way 
                                                     
* © 2012 Linda S. Whitton. Professor of Law and Michael and Dianne Swygert 
Research Fellow, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
** © 2012 Lawrence A. Frolik. Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law. © 2011, Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik. 
All Rights Reserved. The authors wish to express their gratitude to Amy Nowaczyk, M.S., 
J.D., for her invaluable assistance with research, survey distribution, and statistical 
analysis, and to Kimberly S. Wolske, Ph.D., for her expert advice on survey design and 
statistical correlations. 
1 See Judith A. Ouellette & Wendy Wood, Habit and Intention in Everyday Life: The 
Multiple Processes by which Past Behavior Predicts Future Behavior, 124 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 54 (1998). 
2 See generally ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY (Oxford 
Univ. Press 1995) (attesting to the importance of analytical convenience and value of the 
expected utility in guiding decision making and action). 
3 See generally GREGORY ROBINSON-RIEGLER & BRIDGET ROBINSON-RIEGLER, 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: APPLYING THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND 558–60 (2004) (explaining 
the expected utility theory and discussing its shortcomings). 
4 Both past experiences (including prior losses and gains) and future expectations 
influence decision making; however, known future outcomes (sure gains) are believed to 
influence decisions more than past experiences. See E. A. Juliusson et al., Weighing the 
Past and the Future in Decision Making, 17 EUR. J. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 561 (2005). 
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outcome probabilities are presented.6 Framing theory suggests that we choose an 
alternative based on our reference point and that changing the reference point 
through reframing can change our preferences, and ultimately our decision.7 For 
example, surrogate decision makers may be more likely to choose life-prolonging 
procedures for an incapacitated person when the patient’s prognosis is framed 
positively (a doctor’s statement that 30 percent of persons in the patient’s condition 
recover) versus a negative frame (that 70 percent of such patients never regain 
consciousness).8 
This Article addresses the two theoretical reference points used by the law to 
frame how guardians should make decisions for incapacitated persons—the 
substituted judgment standard and the best interest standard.9 Simply stated, the 
substituted judgment standard directs the guardian to choose the alternative that the 
incapacitated person would have chosen if still able to make decisions.10 The best 
interest standard, by contrast, directs the guardian to choose the alternative that 
produces the greatest good or benefit for the incapacitated person.11 
Neither standard, however, is clear-cut when implemented. For example, 
when attempting to use substituted judgment, how should a guardian determine 
                                                     
5 The role of emotions in decision making was studied by comparing patients with 
normal intelligence but a decreased ability to feel and express emotions due to lesions in 
their prefrontal cortex with a group of emotionally healthy participants. See Antonie 
Bechara & Antonio Damasio, The Somatic Market Hypothesis: A Neural Theory of 
Economic Decision, 52 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 336 (2005). The patients with impaired 
emotional abilities had significantly decreased decision-making abilities even with respect 
to routine decisions such as planning their day and choosing activities. Id. When the 
healthy participants were asked to recall a strong emotional event prior to making a 
decision, the accuracy of their decision was significantly affected. Id. 
6 Prospect theory is an alternate theory of decision making that accounts for the values 
people place on gains and losses instead of the probability of the outcome. See Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see also Martin D. Coleman, Sunk Cost and Commitment to 
Medical Treatment, 29 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 121 (2010) (examining the psychological 
tendency to continue to invest time, effort, and money in a failing outcome where there are 
already significant “sunk” costs). 
7 See Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
103 (2007). 
8 See generally E.A. Akl et al., Using Alternative Statistical Formats for Presenting 
Risks and Risk Reductions, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS (2011), 
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD006776.pub2/full 
(researching “the effects of using alternative statistical presentations of the same risks and 
risk reductions on understanding, perception, persuasiveness and behavior of health 
professionals, policy makers, and consumers”). 
9 See infra notes 71–104 and accompanying text for a synthesis of the decision-
making models that have evolved from these standards. 
10 See infra notes 71–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substituted 
judgment standard. 
11 See infra notes 88–98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the best interest 
standard. 
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what the incapacitated person would have chosen? The spectrum of possibilities 
includes prior written directions, past conversations with the person before 
incapacitation, current conversations with the incapacitated person, and what the 
guardian knows about that person’s values and preferences.12 Even when prior 
written directions exist to guide a guardian, the guardian might reasonably question 
whether those directions would be different if the incapacitated person had known 
at the time of writing all of the relevant information about current circumstances.13 
When attempting to make a decision according to the best interest standard, a 
guardian may have to navigate divergent opinions about what is best for the 
incapacitated person. These opinions may come from a variety of sources, 
including financial advisers, health care providers, the incapacitated person’s 
family members, and close friends.14 Reasonable minds might differ on whether to 
define best interest narrowly, by the consequences only to the incapacitated person, 
or more broadly, to include consequences for significant others that the 
incapacitated person, if competent, might have considered.15 
This Article examines the complexities of the substituted judgment and best 
interest standards and evaluates how effectively they provide a decision-making 
paradigm for guardians. Because most states have statutes and case law on 
standards for surrogate health care decisions, this Article focuses primarily on 
other guardian decisions about the person and property of an incapacitated 
individual. Part I reviews current statutory standards. Part II presents five decision-
making models that synthesize divergent theories about the meaning of the 
substituted judgment and best interest standards. Finally, Part III analyzes data 
from our survey about the factors that influence guardian decisions. This analysis 
includes observations about the extent to which surrogate decision-making theory 
fits the reality of how guardians make decisions. 
 
                                                     
12 See infra notes 107–20 and accompanying text for a discussion of studies that 
examined the role of these factors in decision making by surrogates; see also infra notes 
121–175 for a discussion of the role these factors played in surrogate decisions made by 
respondents to our survey. 
13 For a critical examination of whether past statements are an accurate guide for 
present surrogate health care decisions, see Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided 
Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823, 1824–41 (2003); see also 
Pam R. Sailors, Autonomy, Benevolence, and Alzheimer’s Disease, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. 
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 184, 187–88 (2001) (arguing that preferences stated when competent 
may not best serve the incapacitated successor self); Karen B. Hirschman et al., Why 
Doesn’t a Family Member of a Person with Advanced Dementia Use a Substituted 
Judgment When Making a Decision for That Person?, 14 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 
659, 665 (2006) (noting that surrogates for patients with advanced dementia struggle 
between who their relative is now and who their relative was before the dementia). 
14 See infra notes 107–120 and accompanying text for a discussion of studies that 
examined the role of others’ opinions in decision making by surrogates; see also infra notes 
121–175 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role such opinions played in 
surrogate decisions made by respondents to our survey. 
15 See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
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II.  STATUTORY STANDARDS 
 
For the purposes of this Article, we reviewed each jurisdiction’s primary adult 
guardianship statute to identify provisions that give guardians decision-making 
reference points or standards. To keep the basis of inter-jurisdiction comparison 
consistent, we excluded from review separate statutes for conservatorships, 
protective services, veteran’s guardianships, public guardianships, and special 
volunteer guardianship programs. A statutory provision qualified if it could fairly 
be interpreted as containing substituted judgment language, best interest language, 
or some combination of the two. We defined substituted judgment language 
broadly to include any provision that directed a guardian to consider the 
“desires,”16 “personal values,”17 “wishes,”18 “views,”19 or “preferences”20 of the 
incapacitated person. Statutes were then categorized according to those that 
contain substituted judgment language (with or without additional best interest 
language), those that contain only best interest language, and those that are silent. 
We chose to be over-inclusive in the analysis, counting all guardian provisions 
with any substituted judgment or best interest language, even if the context of the 
provision was something less than a stand-alone standard for decision making. 
                                                     
16 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 
29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2011); 
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.20–81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2012); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2010); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e) (LexisNexis 2010); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008). 
17 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 
29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 755 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17(e) (West Supp. 2010) (“ethical values”); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (LexisNexis 
2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) 
(Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e) 
(2010). 
18 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(11) (2005); D.C. CODE § 21-
2047(a)(6) (2010); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.20–81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 
2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(a) (West 2005). 
19 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-656(b) (West Supp. 2011). 
20 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-57(f) (West 2007); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW 
§§ 81.20–81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(a) 
(West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008). One state statute does not 
contain specific substituted judgment terminology but does require input from the 
incapacitated person when possible. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (West 2005) 
(“Whenever meaningful communication is possible, a legally incapacitated individual’s 
guardian shall consult with the legally incapacitated individual before making a major 
decision affecting the legally incapacitated individual.”). 
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Of the fifty-two jurisdictions examined,21 twenty-eight have guardianship 
statutes with no general decision-making standard for guardians.22 Eighteen have 
statutes that contain substituted judgment language,23 most in combination with a 
best interest component.24 The statutes in six jurisdictions make reference to best 
                                                     
21 We reviewed the statutes of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. 
22 ALA. CODE §§ 26-2-2 to -55, 26-2A-1 to -160, 26-3-1 to -14, 26-5-1 to -54, 26-8-1 
to -52, 26-9-1 to -5, 26-9-7 to -19 (LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.001 to .410 
(2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-65-101 to -603, 28-66-101 to -124, 28-67-101 to -111 
(2011); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1400–1490, 1500–1611, 1800–1970, 2100–2893 (2012); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3901–3997 (2007 & Supp. 2010); FLA STAT. ANN. §§ 744.101 
to .715, 747.01 to .052 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-101 to -603 
(West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-1-1 to -13-3 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 633.551 to .682 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 387.010 to .990 (West 2011); 
LA. CODE CIV. PROCEEDINGS   ANN. art. 4542 to art. 4569 (1998 & Supp. 2011); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1021 to 1034 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-101 to -105, 5-
301 to -432 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-101 to -222, 13-704 to -908 
(LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.5-101 to -502 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); 
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-13-1 to -281 (2004 & Supp. 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-5-
101 to -638 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2601 to -2672 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 464-A:1 to :47 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-101 to -617 (LexisNexis 2011); N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-26-01 to -29-31 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 1-101 to 
4-904 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 125.005 to .650 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 62-5-
101 to -435 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-101 to 34-3-109 (2009 & Supp. 2012); TEX. 
PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 601 to 916 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-101 to -433 (West 
2004 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2602 to 3081 (West 2010) (however, 
section 2797 requires a guardian to “manage the estate of his or her ward . . . in a manner 
most beneficial to the ward,” which could be equated with a best interest standard); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 3-1-101 to 3-3-1106 (2011). 
23 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(11) (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-
314(1) (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-656(b) (West Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE 
§ 21-2047(a)(6) (West Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 755 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17(e) 
(West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
190B, § 5-309(a) (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (West 2002); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 3B: 12-57(f) (West 2007); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.2081.21 (McKinney 
2006 & Supp. 2011); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(a) (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2010); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e) (LexisNexis 2010); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008). 
24 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011 ); D.C. CODE § 21-2047(a)(6) 
(West Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 755 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17(e) (West Supp. 
2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-
309(a) (West Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B: 12-57(f) (West 2007); 20 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5521(a) (West 2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. 
CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2005); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e) (2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.20(3)(i) (West 2008). 
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interest, but without a substituted judgment component.25 The following discussion 
further describes the statutory trends within these three groupings. 
 
A.  No General Decision-Making Standard 
 
It is not surprising that more than half of the current guardianship statutes lack 
a general decision-making standard. Even the original Uniform Probate Code 
(UPC) did not articulate how guardians should make decisions. The 1969 UPC 
stated only that a “guardian of an incapacitated person has the same powers, rights 
and duties respecting his ward that a parent has respecting his unemancipated 
minor child.”26 Fourteen of the jurisdictions with no articulated standard contain 
similar language.27 Case law is thin on what it means for a guardian to have the 
same powers, rights, and duties as a parent. The opinions that discuss this language 
do so in the context of the guardian’s scope of authority rather than the process by 
which guardians should make decisions.28 Nonetheless, a customary view is that 
                                                     
25 MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.120(2) (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.079, 
.083 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35A-1241(a)(3), 35A-
1251 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.14 (LexisNexis 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 33-15-29 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.043(4) (West Supp. 2012). 
26 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-312 (1969); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE OFFICIAL 1993 
TEXT WITH COMMENTS 663 (11th ed. 1993). 
27 ALA. CODE § 26-2A-78(a) (LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150(c) 
(2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3922(b) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-312 (2009); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-8-1(a), (b)(1) (West 2010); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 
4566(A) (Supp. 2011) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, the relationship between 
interdict and curator is the same as that between minor and tutor.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:1032(A) (2008) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Part, the relationship between an 
interdict and his curator or continuing tutor is the same as that between a minor and his 
tutor, with respect to the person and property of the interdict.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18-A, § 5-312(a) (1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(b)(1) (LexisNexis 
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-321(2) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2628(a) 
(2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-312(B) (LexisNexis 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-
312(a) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-312(2) (1993); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2-201(e) 
(2009). 
28 See, e.g., Stubblefield v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 677–78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) 
(finding on appeal that trial court interpreted “same powers, rights and duties respecting his 
ward that a parent has respecting his unemancipated minor child” too narrowly when it 
dismissed guardian’s action on behalf of ward for marital dissolution); Nelson v. Nelson, 
878 P.2d 335, 339–40 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (overturning dismissal of guardian’s petition 
for divorce on behalf of the ward, the court found that the statutory language “same rights, 
powers, and duties respecting the ward as a parent has respecting a child” grants guardians 
“exceedingly broad powers,” including “authority to interfere in the most intimately 
personal concerns of an individual’s life”). 
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guardians, having similar duties as parents, should act in the incapacitated person’s 
best interest.29 
A few of the jurisdictions with no general decision-making standard, 
however, do provide a specific decision-making standard for medical decisions.30 
Of these, some require medical decisions to be made according to a substituted 
judgment standard if the wishes of the incapacitated person can be ascertained, but 
if they cannot, the decision is to be made according to the incapacitated person’s 
best interest.31 Others affirmatively obligate the guardian to follow directions 
expressed prior to incapacity32 or, in the negative, not to contravene previously 
expressed wishes.33 One jurisdiction—Delaware—directs that in matters of 
medical consent, the incapacitated person’s best interest should come before the 
personal beliefs of the guardian or those of the incapacitated person.34 
 
B.  Best Interest Language 
 
Six states’ guardianship statutes contain an express reference to “best interest” 
in the context of guardian duties but make no reference to substituted judgment.35 
However, none of these statutes provides guidance as to what “best interest” means 
or what the guardian should consider when determining whether a decision will 
serve the incapacitated person’s best interest. Guardians are simply directed to act, 
or exercise authority, in or for the best interest of the incapacitated person.36 When 
                                                     
29 Michael Casasanto et al., A Model Code of Ethics for Guardians, 11 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 543, 547 (1989) (“The Best Interest Standard mirrors the view that the guardian’s 
duties are akin to those imposed on a parent.”). 
30 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.150(c)(3), (e)(3) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 3922(b)(3) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-312(a)(3) (1998); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) (West Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2628(a)(3) 
(2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(e) (West Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-
312(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2004). 
31 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-312(a)(3) (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
45-5-312(B)(3) (LexisNexis 2004). 
32 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2628(a)(3) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
464-A:25(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
33 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150(e)(3) (2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-
313(c)(4)(i) (West Supp. 2011). 
34 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3922(b)(3) (2007) (“The guardian shall not unreasonably 
withhold such consent or approval nor withhold such consent or approval on account of 
personal beliefs held by the guardian or the disabled person, but shall take such action as 
the guardian objectively believes to be in the best interest of the disabled person.”). 
35 MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.120(2) (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.079, 
.083 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35A-1241(a)(3), 35A-
1251 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.14 (LexisNexis 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 33-15-29 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.043(4) (West Supp. 2012). 
36 MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.120(2) (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.079, 
.083 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35A-1241(a)(3), 35A-
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one adds these six jurisdictions to the fourteen jurisdictions that give guardians the 
“same powers, rights and duties” as a parent37 it results in a total of twenty 
jurisdictions that arguably follow a best interest standard. The lack of statutory 
guidance on the meaning of “best interest” may explain, in part, why there is so 
little case law on the meaning of the standard. Typically, best interest issues arise 
in judicial opinions only when the guardian has egregiously breached the standard 
by neglecting the incapacitated person,38 or by engaging in self-dealing.39 
                                                     
1251 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.14 (LexisNexis 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 33-15-29 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.043(4) (West Supp. 2012). 
37 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
38 See, e.g., In re B.W., No. 04193, 2011 WL 24448373 (Del. Chp. June 3, 2011). In 
that case, a nursing home petitioned the court to remove the daughter as guardian for her 
mother because she chronically rejected prescribed treatment recommendations made by 
the attending physicians. The daughter claimed that the nursing home and the physicians 
were starving her mother by keeping her on a liquid diet. The daughter also claimed that 
the court and others were in a conspiracy to harm her mother. The court removed the 
daughter as guardian because her behavior was detrimental to the ward even though the 
court believed that the guardian “firmly believes that her actions are in the best interest of 
the ward.” Id. at *4. In the case In re Guardianship of Reed, No. 09AP-720, 2010 WL 
369440 (Ohio Ct. App. 10 Dist. Feb. 2, 2010), the court denied a petition by the ward’s 
daughter to remove the guardian. The petitioner disagreed with the physicians as to what 
care was best for the ward. The court held that it could remove a guardian, who must act in 
the best interest of the ward, for neglect of his duty. However, because the guardian was 
performing his duty, his retention would be in the best interest of the ward. Id. at *5. In the 
case In re Guardianship of Clark, No. 09AP-96, 2009 WL 2102154 (Ohio Ct. App. July 
16, 2009), the daughter of the ward petitioned the court to remove the guardian on the 
grounds that he failed to act in the best interest of the ward. The daughter alleged that the 
guardian had restricted the daughter’s access to information about her mother’s medical 
care and severely restricted her right to visit her mother. During the hearing on the petition, 
evidence showed that the daughter had verbally assaulted and physically intimidated her 
mother’s healthcare providers and attempted to meddle with her mother’s medications. On 
appeal, the court held that the guardian’s restrictions on the daughter’s access to 
information about her mother’s health care and visitation rights were reasonable. Id. at *10. 
The court upheld the finding of the trial court that the guardian was acting in the best 
interest of the ward. Id. at *1. 
39 In the case In re Adler, No. 1144, 2003 WL 22053309 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 19, 
2003), co-guardians requested judicial approval of gifts to accelerate eligibility for 
Medicaid. Guardians were the niece and nephew of the ward, who had no children. Court 
denied approval because the gift was not exclusively for the benefit of the incapacitated 
person. Id. at *3. According to the court, the “ward receives no benefit from these gifts.” 
Id. at *5. Although guardians can make gifts that are in the best interest of the ward, any 
“taint of self-dealing will require a court to deny the request.” Id. at *6. Similarly, in the 
case In re Guardianship of Jordan, 616 N.W. 2d 553 (Iowa 2000), the conservator of a 
ward who owned a farm arranged to have the farm sold to a corporation that he controlled. 
The sale was approved by a court as being in the ward’s best interest because sale proceeds 
would pay off the ward’s nursing home bill and relieve the ward of the costs of maintaining 
the property. The estate of the ward sued to overturn the sale. On appeal, the court held that 
the costs of maintaining the property were minimal, and the proceeds of the installment 
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C.  Substituted Judgment Language 
 
Eighteen jurisdictions incorporate some form of substituted judgment 
standard into their guardianship statutes.40 Fourteen of these jurisdictions also 
mention “best interest.”41 The most common form of substituted judgment standard 
is based on language from Section 314(a) of the Uniform Guardianship and 
Protective Proceedings Act (Uniform Act): 
 
Except as otherwise limited by the court, a guardian shall make decisions 
regarding the ward’s support, care, education, health, and welfare. A 
guardian shall exercise authority only as necessitated by the ward’s 
limitations and, to the extent possible, shall encourage the ward to 
participate in decisions, act on the ward’s own behalf, and develop or 
regain the capacity to manage the ward’s personal affairs. A guardian, in 
making decisions, shall consider the expressed desires and personal 
values of the ward to the extent known to the guardian. A guardian at all 
times shall act in the ward’s best interest and exercise reasonable care, 
diligence, and prudence.42 
 
This language was added to the Uniform Act in 1997.43 Nine jurisdictions—
Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, South Dakota, U.S. Virgin 
Islands, Virginia, and West Virginia—have adopted substantially similar 
language.44 
Although the Uniform Act provision encourages guardians to utilize 
substituted judgment by considering the “expressed desires and personal values of 
the ward,” it does not make clear how the guardian is to balance this obligation 
                                                     
sale provided less income than did the rent that ward had previously received. 
Consequently the sale was not in the ward’s best interest and should never have been 
approved even though the sale price was fair. Id. at 560. Additionally, in Estate of Griffin, 
611 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Surr. Ct. 1994), the conservator had chosen retirement benefits for the 
ward that paid a joint, reduced lifetime allowance, providing to the conservator, for her life, 
the same amount that was paid to the ward, if the conservator survived the ward. The 
conservator could have selected payment options that would have resulted in greater 
payments to the ward. The court held that it could authorize a self-dealing transaction if it 
is in the best interest of the ward, id. at 745, but the conservator’s failure to seek prior court 
approval breached her fiduciary responsibilities to the ward. Id. at 746. 
40 See supra text accompanying note 23. 
41 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
42 UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314(a) (1997), available 
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ugppa97.pdf. 
43 Id. § 314 cmt. 
44 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 
29-4-22(a) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-314(a) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2010): VA. 
CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(E) (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-3-1(e) (LexisNexis 2010). 
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with the obligation to “at all times . . . act in the ward’s best interest.” The original 
comment to Section 314(a) did not address this tension: 
 
The ward's personal values and expressed desires, whether past or 
present, are to be considered when making decisions. Although the 
guardian only need consider the ward's desires and values "to the extent 
known to the guardian," that phrase should not be read as an escape or 
excuse for the guardian. Instead, the guardian needs to make an effort to 
learn the ward's personal values and ask the ward about the ward's 
desires before the guardian makes a decision. Subsection (a) requires the 
guardian to act in the ward's best interest. In determining the best interest 
of the ward, the guardian should again consider the ward's personal 
values and expressed desires.45 
 
In the current Uniform Laws Annotated, revised commentary to Section 
314(a) suggests that, whenever possible, a guardian should give more weight to 
substituted judgment than best interest: 
 
Although the guardian only need consider the ward’s desire and values to 
the extent known to the guardian, that phrase should not be read as an 
“out” for the guardian. Instead, the guardian must make an effort to learn 
the ward’s personal values and ask the ward about the ward’s desires 
before the guardian makes a decision. When the guardian is making 
decisions for the ward, the guardian, wherever possible, should use the 
substitute decision-making standard . . . . Only when a guardian is not 
able to ascertain information about the ward’s preferences and desires 
should a guardian use a traditional best interest decision-making 
standard. In determining the best interest of the ward, the guardian 
should again consider the ward’s personal values and expressed desires. 
Instructive to a guardian in understanding substitute decision-making 
would be the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, Section 2(e) and the 
line of “right to die” cases that discuss the substitute decision-making 
process.46 
 
While the revised commentary to Section 314(a) expresses a clear policy 
preference for substituted judgment, the language of the Uniform Act remains 
unchanged and the tension between substituted judgment and best interest 
unresolved. Four states have provisions substantially similar to Section 314(a) but 
use slightly different wording—the provision does not require that the guardian 
shall “at all times” act in the incapacitated person’s best interest, but rather that the 
                                                     
45 UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314 cmt., available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ugppa97.pdf.  
46 UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314 cmt., 8A U.L.A. 370 
(2003) (emphasis added). 
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guardian “shall otherwise” act in the incapacitated person’s best interest.47 For 
example, the relevant part of the Massachusetts statute provides, “[a] guardian, to 
the extent known, shall consider the expressed desires and personal values of the 
incapacitated person when making decisions, and shall otherwise act in the 
incapacitated person’s best interest and exercise reasonable care, diligence, and 
prudence.”48 A plausible explanation for this difference may be the legislative 
intent that the guardian should consider best interest only when there are no 
expressed desires and personal values to support substituted judgment. 
Unfortunately, none of the statutes of the nine states with Section 314(a)–type 
language provide guidance as to how the guardian should proceed when 
substituted judgment and best interest conflict.  
Unlike the Uniform Act language, the statutes in the District of Columbia and 
Illinois provide a clear hierarchical approach to applying substituted judgment and 
best interest, and unequivocally state a preference for substituted judgment when 
possible. In the District of Columbia, the guardian shall “[m]ake decisions on 
behalf of the ward by conforming as closely as possible to a standard of substituted 
judgment or, if the ward’s wishes are unknown and remain unknown after 
reasonable efforts to discern them, make the decision on the basis of the ward’s 
best interests.”49 Illinois provides even more detailed guidance to the guardian: 
 
Decisions made by a guardian on behalf of a ward shall be made 
in accordance with the following standards for decision making. 
Decisions made by a guardian on behalf of a ward may be made by 
conforming as closely as possible to what the ward, if competent, would 
have done or intended under the circumstances, taking into account 
evidence that includes, but is not limited to, the ward’s personal, 
philosophical, religious and moral beliefs, and ethical values relative to 
the decision to be made by the guardian. Where possible, the guardian 
shall determine how the ward would have made a decision based on the 
ward’s previously expressed preferences, and make decisions in 
accordance with the preferences of the ward. If the ward’s wishes are 
unknown and remain unknown after reasonable efforts to discern them, 
the decision shall be made on the basis of the ward’s best interests as 
determined by the guardian. In determining the ward’s best interests, the 
guardian shall weigh the reason for and nature of the proposed action, the 
benefit or necessity of the action, the possible risks and other 
consequences of the proposed action, and any available alternatives and 
their risks, consequences and benefits, and shall take into account any 
other information, including the views of family and friends, that the 
                                                     
47 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-402 
(West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020 (E) (2011); W. VA. CODE § 44A-3-1(e) (2010). 
48 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (West Supp. 2010) (emphasis added). 
49 D.C. CODE § 21-2047(a)(6) (2010). 
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guardian believes the ward would have considered if able to act for 
herself or himself.50  
 
In other jurisdictions that have both substituted judgment and best interest 
language in their guardianship statutes, it is less clear how the two concepts 
interrelate. Pennsylvania’s statute provides in pertinent part: “It shall be the duty of 
the guardian of the person to assert the rights and best interests of the incapacitated 
person. Expressed wishes and preferences of the incapacitated person shall be 
respected to the greatest possible extent.”51 Similar to the Pennsylvania provision, 
the New Jersey statute provides, “[A] guardian of the person of a ward shall 
exercise authority over matters relating to the rights and best interest of the ward’s 
personal needs, . . . a guardian shall give due regard to the preferences of the ward, 
if known to the guardian or otherwise ascertainable upon reasonable inquiry.”52 
Wisconsin requires that a guardian “[a]dvocate for the ward’s best interests”53 and 
consider, consistent with the functional limitations of the incapacitated person, 
“[t]he ward’s personal preferences and desires with regard to managing his or her 
activities of daily living.”54 
The remaining four states—Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, and New 
York—have substituted judgment language in their statutes, but no express 
mention of best interest.55 Guardians in Arizona are to consider the ward’s “values 
and wishes,”56 while in Connecticut, the conservator is to “ascertain the conserved 
person’s views,” and “make decisions in conformance with the conserved person’s 
                                                     
50 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-17(e) (West Supp. 2011). 
51 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521(a) (West 2005). On petition by parental guardian 
to authorize termination of life support for adult son in persistent vegetative state, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania opined that “where there is enough data for the decision 
maker to ascertain what the patient would have desired, the decision maker must effectuate 
substituted judgment.” In re Fiore, 673 A.2d 905, 912 n.11 (Pa. 1996). In such 
circumstances, according to the court, “a best interest analysis may not be employed,” 
suggesting that in Pennsylvania, the two tests are polar opposites. Id. Either the guardian 
has “enough data” to know what the incapacitated person wants and so applies substituted 
judgment or the guardian does not and so must use a best interest test. In Fiore, the court 
permitted the guardian to consider “all aspects of [the ward’s] personality,” indicating a 
very expansive notion of what factors a guardian can consider to invoke a substituted 
judgment. Id. at 911; see also infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the expanded substituted judgment model. 
52 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-57(f) (West 2007); see In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1280 
(N.J. 1994) (“The substituted-judgment and best-interest tests are not dichotomous, but 
represent points on a continuum of subjective and objective information leading to a 
reliable decision that gives as much weight as possible to the right of self-determination.”). 
53 WIS. STAT. § 54.18(1)(b) (West 2008). 
54 WIS. STAT. § 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008). 
55 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(11) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-
656(b) (West Supp. 200410); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (West 2002); N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.20, 81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. McKinney 2011). 
56 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(11) (2005). 
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reasonable and informed expressed preferences.”57 Michigan simply provides that 
“[w]henever meaningful communication is possible, a legally incapacitated 
individual’s guardian shall consult with the legally incapacitated individual before 
making a major decision affecting the legally incapacitated individual.”58 A 
guardian in New York is required to “afford the incapacitated person the greatest 
amount of independence and self-determination . . . in light of that person’s 
functional level, understanding and appreciation of his or her functional 
limitations, and personal wishes, preferences and desires.”59 Each of these statutes 
encourages guardians to make decisions based on notions of substituted judgment, 
but none address how the guardian is to make decisions if the values, views, 
wishes, or preferences of the incapacitated person cannot be obtained. 
In 2000, the National Guardianship Association (NGA) adopted standards of 
practice which include Standard 7—Standards for Decision-Making.60 Standard 7 
defines substituted judgment as “the principle of decision-making that substitutes, 
as the guiding force in any surrogate decision made by the guardian, the decision 
the ward would have made when competent.”61 Standard 7 further provides that 
“Substituted Judgment is not used when following the ward’s wishes would cause 
substantial harm to the ward or when the guardian cannot establish the ward’s prior 
wishes.”62 If the guardian is unable to ascertain the ward’s “prior or current 
wishes,” or if “following the ward’s wishes would cause substantial harm to the 
ward,” then Standard 7 directs the guardian to use the best interest standard.63 
There is a subtle, but significant, difference between the Uniform Act 
language and the NGA standard. The Uniform Act language is ambiguous about 
the relative weight that guardians should give substituted judgment versus best 
interest. Without the benefit of the revised commentary, a guardian could sensibly 
conclude that substituted judgment is to be employed only when doing so is also in 
the incapacitated person’s best interest.64 In contrast, the NGA standard encourages 
a guardian to use substituted judgment so long as the decision will not cause 
substantial harm. In other words, under the NGA approach substituted judgment 
trumps best interest except in circumstances where the decision would cause 
substantial harm. The plain meaning of the Uniform Act language suggests that 
best interest trumps substituted judgment if the two conflict. 
On a continuum framed by protection on the one end and self-determination 
on the other, the most protective standard would be one that favors best interest 
over substituted judgment when the two conflict. The standard most deferential to 
self-determination interests would be the hierarchy approach that favors substituted 
                                                     
57 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-656(b) (West Supp. 2010). 
58 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (LexisNexis 2005). 
59 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.20–81.21 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2012). 
60 See NAT’L GUARDIANSHIP ASS’N, Standard 7: Standards for Decision-Making, in 
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE (3d ed. 2007). 
61 Id. at 5. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 6. 
64 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
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judgment over best interest whenever possible. The NGA approach offers a 
compromise point somewhere between the two standards as it favors substituted 
judgment—provided the decision will not result in substantial harm. Consider the 
following example that demonstrates how these three approaches for balancing 
substituted judgment and best interest might lead to different decisions: 
 
Esther, a widow with considerable retirement assets, regularly supports 
environmental organizations that work to save endangered species. On 
numerous occasions Esther has told Helen, her niece, that she would 
rather protect endangered species than accumulate possessions or leave a 
large estate. Helen was recently appointed Esther’s guardian after a 
stroke left Esther cognitively impaired. Helen must decide whether to 
continue Esther’s large annual gifts to environmental organizations, or 
conserve her assets to pay for the home care that Esther currently 
receives. If Esther were moved to assisted living, there would likely be 
enough assets to continue the gifts and pay for her care. 
 
Under the Uniform Act language, Helen might decide that Esther’s best interest—
continued home care—trumps her wish to make large charitable gifts, and thus 
choose to reduce or stop the gifts. If Helen follows the hierarchy approach, she 
might decide to continue the gifts because Esther’s wishes are known and 
unequivocal—it is what Esther would do if she were still able to decide for herself. 
Helen might also decide to continue the gifts if she follows NGA Standard 7 
because the consequence to Esther is something less than substantial harm—she 
can receive adequate care in an assisted living residence rather than at home. 
 
III.  THE THEORY: SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT AND  
BEST INTEREST—FIVE MODELS 
 
Literature devoted to the substituted judgment and best interest standards 
contains widely divergent opinions about the meaning and application of the 
standards.65 To synthesize the spectrum of viewpoints, we have created five 
representative models labeled: Strict Substituted Judgment,66 Expanded Substituted 
Judgment,67 Strict Best Interest,68 Expanded Best Interest,69 and Hybrid Substituted 
Judgment/Best Interest.70 For each model we have articulated a decision-making 
standard and provided examples of how the standard might be applied. 
 
                                                     
65 See infra notes 71–104 and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 71–78 and accompanying text. 
67 See infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text. 
68 See infra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. 
69 See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
70 See infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Strict Substituted Judgment Model 
 
1.  Decision-Making Standard 
 
Decisions should be based on the incapacitated person’s prior directions and 
expressed wishes. 
 
The strict substituted judgment model requires the guardian to make decisions 
based on actual knowledge of what the incapacitated person would have done.71 
Actual knowledge can come from the incapacitated person’s prior directions or, 
when there are no specific directions on point, the guardian can rely on the 
incapacitated person’s reasonably instructive, previously expressed desires.72 Some 
argue that when the guardian knows what the incapacitated person wants, the 
guardian is not making a surrogate decision, but instead reporting a decision 
already made by the incapacitated person.73 Proponents contend that strict 
substituted judgment best protects the autonomy and self-determination interests of 
the incapacitated person.74 
The strict substituted judgment model has two shortcomings. First, some 
argue that substituted judgment is unreliable because an individual’s preferences 
change over time;75 choices made while competent may not be what a person 
would direct if it were possible to know the wishes of the later incapacitated 
                                                     
71 Ursala K. Braun et al., Reconceptualizing the Experience of Surrogate Decision 
Making: Reports vs Genuine Decisions, 7 ANNALS FAM. MED. 249, 249–52 (2009) (noting 
the “high evidentiary standards” which must be met for substituted judgment). 
72 Mark R. Tonelli, Substituted Judgment in Medical Practice: Evidentiary Standards 
on a Sliding Scale, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 22, 22–23 (1997) (observing that the various 
formulations of the substituted judgment standard attempt to “incorporate the relevant 
aspects of an individual’s previously expressed beliefs, values, and goals”). 
73 Braun et al., supra note 71, at 252. 
74 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT 
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 222–29 (1993) (providing a 
discussion of how the doctrine of substituted judgment promotes individual autonomy). 
75 See generally Alexia M. Torke et al., Substituted Judgment: The Limitations of 
Autonomy in Surrogate Decision Making, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1514 (2008) 
(providing an analysis of the unreliability of substituted judgment in the context of health 
care decision making). Even when the issue concerns property, it would seem the greater 
the time lag between a prior statement and the surrogate decision, the less certain the 
guardian can be that the statement reflects what the incapacitated person might want now. 
Some contend that “conclusively determining whether or not any type of surrogate makes 
the decisions that an incapacitated person would have made for him or herself is 
impossible.” Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care 
Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance Directives: A Psychological Critique, 42 
GA. L. REV. 979, 994 (2008); see also Dresser, supra note 13, at 1823 (arguing that a 
“reliance on advance treatment choice is misguided and morally troubling”). 
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“successor” self.76 Second, the more pragmatic criticism of strict substituted 
judgment is that lack of prior directions or express wishes severely limits what a 
guardian can do.77 Mere suspicion or supposition will not suffice; the guardian 
must have objective evidence of the incapacitated person’s actual intent. 
 
2.  Examples 
 
Actual knowledge of the incapacitated person’s intent can come from prior 
statements such as: 
 
 “I want my dog, Fluffy, to be taken care of should anything happen to 
me.” 
 “I will pay for the cost of a college education for my niece Melanie at 
XYZ University.” 
 “Never sell my classic 1965 Mustang convertible.” 
 
And, if there are no prior statements right on point, clearly expressed wishes 
can suffice:  
 
 Jim told his family before he became incapacitated that he was a strong 
supporter of his church’s youth outreach program. When the church 
proposed building a youth center, Jim had remarked, “You can count on 
me to do my part.” Now Jim is incapacitated and the Church has 
approached his guardian for a donation on Jim’s behalf. The guardian may 
make the donation under a strict substituted judgment standard because 
Jim’s desire to financially support the project is reasonably inferred from 
his earlier general statements. 
 
                                                     
76 See generally Sailors, supra note 13, at 190–93 (arguing that a radical change in 
someone’s personal identity can lead to the emergence of a “successor self” that should be 
protected as if it were a distinct person). 
77 The failure to give prior directions and authority through a power of attorney and 
advance directives is usually the reason a guardianship must be established for an 
incapacitated person. Although estimates vary on how many persons have executed health 
care advance directives, a 2007 poll conducted by AARP found the “overall completion 
rate of either a living will or a health care proxy document was only 29 percent.” Charles P. 
Sabatino, The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy, 88 MILBANK 
Q. 211, 221 (2010). 
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Many persons under a guardianship are not completely incapacitated. They 
frequently have enough limited capacity to understand a question and express a 
response. To the extent an incapacitated person can participate in a decision, the 
guardian can use that expression as the basis for substituted judgment.78 For 
example: 
 
 Suppose Cally, age 77, is suffering from early stages of dementia and the 
court appoints a guardian to handle her extensive assets. Prior to the 
commencement of the guardianship, Cally had taken several extended 
cruises with her twenty-eight-year-old granddaughter, Ginny. Cally always 
paid all the cost of Ginny’s cruise. The guardian is approached by Ginny 
who proposes that she take Cally on a three-week cruise at a cost of $7,000 
each or a total of $14,000. The cruise quality is comparable to those that 
she and Cally took in the past. The guardian asks Cally if she would like to 
go on the cruise with Ginny. Cally, though confused, is clear that she 
would like to go on the cruise. Under the doctrine of strict substituted 
judgment, the guardian may approve the expenditure because Cally’s 
current expression of her wishes is consistent with her past decisions and 
conduct. 
 
B.  Expanded Substituted Judgment Model 
 
1.  Decision-Making Standard 
 
Decisions may be based on the incapacitated person’s prior statements, actions, 
values, and preferences. 
 
The expanded substituted judgment model provides greater latitude as to the 
kind of evidence used to ascertain the incapacitated person’s preferences and 
lowers the degree of certainty required before the guardian can act.79 Under this 
                                                     
78 UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 314(a) (1997), available 
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ugppa97.htm; id. § 314 cmt. 
(noting that, “the guardian must make an effort to learn the ward’s personal values and ask 
the ward about the ward’s desires before the guardian makes a decision”); see, e.g., MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5314 (LexisNexis 2005) (“Whenever meaningful communication 
is possible, a legally incapacitated individual’s guardian shall consult with the legally 
incapacitated individual before making a major decision affecting the legally incapacitated 
individual.”). 
79 See Kathy Cerminara, Tracking the Storm: The Far-Reaching Power of Forces 
Propelling the Schiavo Cases, 35 STETSON L. REV. 147, 165 (2005) (“Evidence of 
precisely what the patient would have wanted, in the form of written advance directives or 
oral statements . . . is useful, but it is not required. A decision made pursuant to a 
substituted judgment standard can be determined by asking what a patient would have 
wanted based on that patient’s values, beliefs, and attitudes.”). But ascertaining the 
preference of an incapacitated person can be difficult. “In making a substituted judgment, a 
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model, the guardian may look beyond definitive past statements for general 
statements that reflect the incapacitated person’s attitude on a subject.80 The 
guardian may also look to past actions, decisions, and even impressions about the 
incapacitated person’s values to discern what the incapacitated person would do 
under the present circumstances.81 
The advantage of the expanded substituted judgment model over the strict 
model is that a guardian is allowed to make reasonable inferences based on what is 
known about the person, which may produce decisions that more closely 
approximate what the incapacitated person would choose if still able to make 
decisions.82 In theory, this model is appealing because it permits a personally-
tailored decision in circumstances where the incapacitated person did not 
previously express specific expectations or directions. The strength of this model, 
however, is also its weakness when the guardian does not have background upon 
which to rely, even in an expanded notion of substituted judgment. For example, a 
spouse acting as guardian usually has a broad range of past experiences upon 
which to base surrogate decisions, but a professional guardian typically has had no 
contact with an incapacitated person before the loss of capacity. The guardian with 
no personal knowledge of the incapacitated person’s prior statements, actions, 
values, and preferences must either obtain that information from other sources or 
use a different standard for making the surrogate decision.83 
Critics of the expanded substituted judgment concept question the reliability 
of secondary sources of information about the incapacitated person’s values and 
preferences.84 Even where the guardian has first-hand knowledge of these 
                                                     
proxy must interpret, construe, exegete another person’s autonomy from the complex, 
multi-leveled, shifting text of that person’s life.” Bart J. Collopy, The Moral Underpinning 
of the Proxy-Provider Relationship: Issues of Trust and Distrust, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
37, 40 (1999). 
80 See supra note 51 (discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
substituted judgment); see also Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Incapacitated and Alone: 
Healthcare Decision Making for Unbefriended Older People, 31 HUM. RTS. 20, 22 (2004) 
(recommending that long-term care facilities and staff should play a greater role in 
“investigating and conveying resident values and preferences,” including developing 
procedures for “collecting and using resident histories and values information”). 
81 Karp & Wood, supra note 80, at 22. 
82 See Daniel P. Sulmasy & Lois Snyder, Substituted Interests and Best Judgments, 
304 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1946, 1946–47 (2010) (arguing that a “substituted interests” 
approach, based on a patient’s “authentic values and interests” could permit a “best 
judgment” on behalf of the incapacitated person in circumstances where a patient’s 
preferences are unknown). 
83 See infra notes 148–153, 167–175 and accompanying text (reporting that among 
respondents to our survey, nonfamily guardians more often considered prior written 
directions, current conversations, and what others told them about the values and 
preferences of the incapacitated person in order to determine what the incapacitated person 
would want). 
84 Rebecca Dresser, Shiavo’s Legacy: The Need for an Objective Standard, 35 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 20, 20 (2005) (“Decisions based on the substituted judgment standard 
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preferences, some argue that surrogate decision makers are inherently biased by 
their own perspectives.85 In addition, opponents of substituted judgment—whether 
under a strict or expanded model—contend that a guardian cannot be sure that an 
individual’s past statements reflect what the person might want under present 
circumstances.86 Given the importance of present circumstances to a decision, they 
argue that past pronouncements are little more than guesses as to how one might 
react in the present.87 
 
2.  Examples 
 
Notwithstanding criticisms of expanded substituted judgment, the following 
examples illustrate how this model might facilitate a decision that would not be 
possible under strict substituted judgment: 
 
 Suppose that Millie, an incapacitated person, received a solicitation from 
the local YWCA to make a gift of $1,000 to honor her deceased mother. 
Millie’s mother had been a lifelong member of the YWCA. Millie, a past 
member for ten years, once gave a $500 gift to the YWCA. Three years 
ago Millie gave $1,000 to the United Way in memory of her mother. The 
guardian believes that Millie might have approved of a donation to the 
YWCA to honor her mother, but under a strict substituted judgment 
standard, the guardian would lack sufficient evidence of that intent to 
justify making the gift. Under the expanded substituted judgment standard, 
the guardian can justify the gift as consistent with the totality of Millie’s 
past conduct and decisions. 
 
 The recently appointed professional guardian for Jane, age 85, was asked 
to move Jane from her home to a safer living environment. The guardian 
learned from Jane’s pastor that five years ago Jane helped her best friend 
sell her house and move to assisted living after the friend was diagnosed 
with Parkinson’s disease. Jane had remarked to the pastor, “Too many 
older women continue to live alone in their houses long after it is safe to 
do so.” If Jane is unable to engage in a current conversation about her 
residential preferences, the guardian could conclude based on Jane’s past 
acts and statements that she would approve of a move to an assisted living 
facility. 
                                                     
can be influenced by people reporting and interpreting the evidence about patient’s 
preferences.”); see also infra notes 117–120 and accompanying text. 
85 Dresser, supra note 84, at 21–22. 
86 See generally Dresser, supra note 13, at 1823–24 (arguing that precommitment is 
an “inferior strategy for making end-of-life decisions” and that “a person’s statements 
about future care can be relevant” but are “just one element of a complex situation”); 
Sailors, supra note 13 (arguing that changed circumstances make an individual’s past 
statements an unreliable basis for current decision making). 
87 Dresser, supra note 13, at 1823. 
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C.  Strict Best Interest Model 
 
1.  Decision-Making Standard 
 
Decisions should be based on a comparison of the benefits and burdens from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person in the incapacitated person’s circumstances. 
 
The strict best interest model requires the guardian to make decisions that best 
promote the well-being of the incapacitated person. Rather than attempting to 
ascertain or project what the incapacitated person would do, the guardian is to 
make decisions based on what a reasonable person in the incapacitated person’s 
circumstances would do, weighing the burdens and benefits of the proposed course 
of action.88 The strict best interest model does not presume that the incapacitated 
person is a reasonable person or would only act as a reasonable person would; 
rather, the model attempts to foster decisions that are reasonable because they best 
promote the well-being of the incapacitated person.89 
The chief criticism of the strict best interest model is that it is paternalistic—it 
trades off the self-determination interests of the incapacitated individual for the 
benefit of protecting that person.90 However, this trade-off may be unavoidable 
when substituted judgment is impossible because the desires or attitudes of the 
incapacitated individual cannot be ascertained.91 Opinions vary about whether the 
desires of the incapacitated person, when known, should take priority in guiding a 
guardian’s decision.92 Proponents of the strict best interest model argue that the 
incapacitated person’s wishes should be followed only when the course of action 
also is the best to promote the well-being of the incapacitated person.93 
The strict best interest model is further criticized because it does not 
necessarily produce a fixed, objective decision. A guardian acting under this 
standard must determine what is in the incapacitated person’s best interest, but 
different guardians may reach different conclusions under similar circumstances. 
                                                     
88 Lawrence A. Frolik, Is a Guardian the Alter Ego of the Ward?, 37 STETSON L. REV. 
53, 69 (2007) (the best interests test manifests what a reasonable person would do); Loretta 
Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons of All 
Ages, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 187, 188 (2007) (best interest “guides decision-makers to 
pick from among options that reasonable persons of good will would consider acceptable”). 
Best interests can be divided into what is best for the present and what is best for one’s life 
in an overall sense. Sailors, supra note 13, at 188. 
89 See Sailors, supra note 13, at 188. 
90 See Bruce Jennings, Freedom Fading: On Dementia, Best Interests, and Public 
Safety, 35 GA. L. REV. 593, 605 (2000). 
91 Given that most individuals will not have expressed an opinion on the issue for 
which a decision has to be made, in many cases the guardian will necessarily have to resort 
to the best interest test. Cerminara, supra note 79, at 165. 
92 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
93 See generally Sailors, supra note 13; Dresser, supra note 13 (both arguing that the 
substituted judgment standard is an unreliable basis upon which to base current surrogate 
decisions). 
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Furthermore, the guardian’s decision may be influenced by the opinions of others 
who have an interest in the incapacitated person’s welfare, including family 
members, friends, and professionals such as clergy, health care providers, lawyers, 
and financial advisers.94 
 
2.  Examples 
 
The following examples illustrate how decisions under a strict best interest 
model may differ from those made under substituted judgment models: 
 
 The guardian for eighty-five-year-old Oliver must decide whether to 
transfer the title of his BMW to his sixty-year-old son, Charles. Oliver has 
moderate dementia and can no longer drive. Records substantiate that 
Oliver’s past practice was to buy a new car every four years and give his 
old car to his son. The BMW has a present market value of $20,000. 
Oliver currently lives in an assisted living facility. His yearly expenses are 
$72,000, but his annual income, composed of Social Security and a small 
pension, is only $52,000. The shortfall each year is paid from his savings 
which are currently valued at $100,000. At this rate, Oliver’s savings will 
be exhausted in a little over 5 years. Despite Charles’s protests that Oliver 
would want him to have the car, the guardian chooses to sell the BMW 
because that is what a reasonably prudent person in Oliver’s circumstances 
would do to conserve assets for future needs. This choice promotes 
Oliver’s well-being without regard to the interests of anyone else. While a 
substituted judgment standard might support making the gift of the car to 
Charles, a strict best interest standard does not. 
 
 Betty is a ninety-year-old widow who suffers from emphysema and mild 
dementia. She lives in a remote area on a lake in a cabin-style home built 
by her late husband. Her recently divorced granddaughter lives with her as 
a helpmate and companion. Betty’s eldest daughter, Ann, is her guardian. 
All of the family members are aware of Betty’s strong desire to live the 
remainder of her life at the cabin. She has said many times, “I will live 
here until they carry me out feet first.” Betty’s doctor recently ordered 
oxygen as an assistive therapy for her breathing difficulties. Ann is 
concerned about the frequent power outages at the cabin and has decided 
over the objections of Betty, her granddaughter, and other family 
                                                     
94 In fact, such input is often encouraged. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-
17(e) (West Supp. 2011) (“In determining the ward’s best interests, the guardian shall 
weigh the reason for and nature of the proposed action, the benefit or necessity of the 
action, the possible risks and other consequences of the proposed action, and any available 
alternatives and their risks, consequences and benefits, and shall take into account any 
other information, including the views of family and friends, that the guardian believes the 
ward would have considered if able to act for herself or himself.”); see also Sulmasy & 
Snyder, supra note 82, at 1946–47. 
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members, to move Betty to an assisted living facility in town. She believes 
this is the only decision consistent with Betty’s best interest. Under a 
substituted judgment standard, Ann might choose instead to buy a 
generator for the cabin, a decision that both reduces the risk to Betty and 
respects her wish to live at the cabin. 
 
D.  Expanded Best Interest Model 
 
1.  Decision-Making Standard 
 
Decisions should be based on a comparison of the benefits and burdens from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person in the incapacitated person’s circumstances, and 
may include consideration of consequences for significant others if a reasonable 
person might ordinarily consider such consequences. 
 
The expanded best interest model recognizes that incapacitated persons do not 
live in a vacuum and that guardians should be able to consider the consequences a 
decision would have for people whose interests the incapacitated person would 
ordinarily consider if competent.95 Such persons might include the incapacitated 
person’s spouse, children, or other companions. Unlike the strict best interest 
model, which focuses solely on the consequences to the incapacitated person,96 the 
                                                     
95 See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). There the court 
was asked to approve a transplant of a kidney from one brother, who had been 
incapacitated from birth, to another brother, whose kidneys were failing. Id. at 145–46. 
Although the incapacitated brother could not opine as to whether he might want to donate a 
kidney, the court nevertheless approved the donation as in the best interest of the 
incapacitated brother because he would have been emotionally devastated if his brother 
died. Id. at 149. Courts have often used the expanded best interest model under the label of 
“substituted judgment” in circumstances where there was no evidence upon which a true 
substituted judgment could be based. In Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Meriv. 99, 100–02, 35 Eng. 
Rep. 878, 878–79 (Ch. 1816), the court granted the niece’s request for an increased 
allowance from the estate of Hinde, her incapacitated uncle, because it believed that this is 
what “the Lunatic himself would have done.” Id. at 102, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879. The court 
opined that Hinde would likely prefer to support his niece rather than suffer the 
embarrassment of her poverty. Id. The court did not cite any prior statements or acts by 
Hinde that would support this opinion, but simply concluded that an increased allowance is 
what Hinde would have done, “if he were in a capacity to exercise any discretion on the 
subject.” Id. at 100 n.a, 35 Eng. Rep. at 878. Additionally, in In re Daly, 536 N.Y.S.2d 393 
(Sur. 1988), the court approved annual gifts of $60,000 from the taxable estate of a person 
who was profoundly disabled because of medical malpractice at birth. Thus, the court 
could not rely on “subjective intent” and instead had to “employ an objective standard and 
inquire as to what a reasonable and prudent person would do in the circumstances.” Id. at 
395. 
96 See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. 
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expanded model contemplates that most reasonable persons also consider the 
impact of their decisions on others for whom they care.97 
Of course, taking into consideration the interests of others raises the question 
of whose interests should be considered and how much weight should be given to 
those interests. A guardian making decisions under an expanded best interest 
model is still obligated to promote the best interest of the incapacitated person 
without becoming unduly influenced by the needs of others, no matter how 
compelling. The primary criticism of the expanded best interest model is that 
permitting guardians to consider the effect of their decisions on the well-being of 
others, including themselves, may be the first step on a slippery slope leading to 
exploitation of the incapacitated person.98 
 
2.  Examples 
 
The following scenarios illustrate guardian decisions that rest on an expanded 
best interest model—one that contemplates the impact not only on the 
incapacitated person, but also on individuals whose interests the incapacitated 
person would likely consider if competent to do so: 
 
 Jed is a seventy-five-year-old widower who moved to a nursing home 
because of his dementia. Jed owns a nine-year-old golden retriever, Lady, 
who could not accompany him to the nursing home. Jed’s granddaughter, 
Emily, is very close to her grandfather and to Lady. Emily and her mother 
cannot keep the dog because their condominium association does not allow 
pets. Jed’s guardian approves expenditures for Lady to live at a rescue 
shelter where Emily can visit. Although Jed’s mental condition has 
deteriorated to the point where he is unaware of the arrangements made for 
Lady, the guardian knows it would have been very distressing for Emily if 
Lady had been euthanized. The guardian believes that doing what a 
compassionate person would do in Jed’s circumstances—if Jed could have 
made the arrangements himself—is what is in the best interest of Jed, 
Emily, and Lady. 
 
 Joanne has dementia and can no longer live safely by herself. Her 
daughter, Beth, a registered nurse, is planning to take a leave of absence so 
that she can see to her mother’s care full time. Beth is also Joanne’s 
                                                     
97 See supra note 95. 
98 In a discussion between author Linda S. Whitton and members of the National 
Conference of Lawyers and Corporate Fiduciaries, corporate guardians stated that some of 
their toughest decisions involve expenditures which provide an incidental benefit to family 
members or companions of the incapacitated person. Examples include requests for funds 
to go on vacation, do home renovations, and buy a new vehicle. The corporate guardians 
indicated that they usually seek prior court approval of such expenditures—both to protect 
the incapacitated person’s interests and to protect the guardian from potential liability. 
Meeting in Washington, D.C., on June 3, 2011. 
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guardian. Beth would like to use some of her mother’s money to convert a 
family room into a first floor bedroom and bathroom for her mother’s use. 
Beth is concerned that her siblings, all of whom live out of state, will claim 
Beth is using her mother’s money to benefit herself. Beth is seeking court 
approval to pay for the home modifications. The court may approve these 
expenditures under an expanded best interest standard. Even though Beth 
will receive an incidental benefit, the expenditures make it possible for 
Joanne to avoid institutionalization and to receive care from someone who 
loves her. 
 
E.  Hybrid Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Model 
 
1.  Decision-Making Standards 
 
1) Decisions should be based on substituted judgment if there is evidence of what 
the incapacitated person would have wanted; if not, then the decisions should be 
based on the person’s best interest. 
 
2) Decisions should be based on substituted judgment if there is evidence of what 
the incapacitated person would have wanted and the decision also promotes the 
incapacitated person’s best interest. If there is no evidence to support substituted 
judgment, then the decision should be based on best interest. 
 
As previously discussed, two predominant approaches have emerged in 
jurisdictions with both substituted judgment and best interest standards in their 
guardianship statutes.99 One is a hierarchical model, which requires the guardian to 
first employ substituted judgment if there is evidence of what the incapacitated 
person would want.100 Under this approach, a guardian is to resort to the best 
interest standard only when evidence of what the incapacitated person would want 
is lacking.101 A criticism of the hierarchical model is that it often fails to address 
the reality of current circumstances and the relevant interests of incapacitated 
persons because surrogates rarely know the incapacitated person’s precise 
wishes.102 
The other model—based on the Uniform Act’s language—encourages 
substituted judgment provided that the decision is also in the incapacitated 
person’s best interest.103 The guardian must first look to the expressed directions, 
desires, and values of the incapacitated person as the starting point for decision-
making and then craft a decision that promotes the incapacitated person’s best 
interest.104 Of course, how the guardian interprets substituted judgment and best 
                                                     
99 See supra notes 40–63 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra notes 49, 50 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra notes 49, 50 and accompanying text. 
102 Sulmasy & Snyder, supra note 82, at 1946–47. 
103 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
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interest—using the strict or expanded models—will also impact the outcome of the 
decision-making process. 
 
2.  Examples 
 
The following examples illustrate how guardians make decisions under the 
hybrid substituted judgment/best interest models and how the decisions might 
differ depending on the manner in which the model is applied. 
 
 Mary had a long-standing practice of giving each of her three 
grandchildren an annual gift of $5,000. After she became incapacitated, 
four more grandchildren were born. Prior to her incapacity, Mary left 
instructions to continue the annual gifts. Mary’s guardian must now decide 
whether to continue the annual gifts and, if so, in what amounts. Before 
Mary’s incapacitation, the annual gifts totaled $15,000. If the guardian 
now makes annual $5,000 gifts to all of the grandchildren, the total annual 
amount will be $35,000—more than double the past amount. Using a 
hierarchical substituted judgment/best interest approach, the guardian 
could decide to continue the $5,000 annual gifts for each grandchild. 
Under the Uniform Act language, the guardian would more likely continue 
the practice of annual gifts, in line with substituted judgment but, in 
recognition of Mary’s need for costly long-term care, reduce the amount of 
each gift to preserve Mary’s capital. 
 
 Ann inherited a classic 1955 pink Thunderbird Convertible from her sister. 
In her will, Ann leaves the car jointly to her sister’s children, Nick and 
Nora. Ann now has dementia and resides in an assisted living facility. Her 
guardian wants to stop paying storage costs for the car and must decide on 
an appropriate solution. Nick has no interest in the car and Nora, although 
she wants the car, cannot afford to buy out her brother’s share. The 
guardian suggested transferring ownership of the car jointly to Nick and 
Nora, but Nick refuses this arrangement. Under a hierarchical substituted 
judgment/best interest approach, the guardian might decide to follow 
Ann’s wishes and not sell the car—especially in light of Nora’s pleas that 
waiting will allow her time to purchase her brother’s share. Under the 
Uniform Act language, the guardian may decide that she must do what 
promotes Ann’s best interest—sell the car now to save storage fees and 
distribute the proceeds equally to Nick and Nora. 
 
IV.  THE REALITY: HOW GUARDIANS MAKE DECISIONS 
 
Our literature review revealed almost no formalized study of how guardians 
make decisions. Numerous studies have attempted to ascertain how accurately 
health care surrogates can predict what still-competent patients would choose in 
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various health care scenarios.105 While mixed, the results of these studies suggest 
that surrogate’s predictions often miss the mark.106 Sifting through studies about 
surrogate health care decisions, we found two that examined the role of substituted 
judgment and best interest in the decision-making process. One study was 
conducted by interviewing thirty family members of patients with advanced 
dementia.107 The other was conducted using interviews with fifty surrogate 
decision makers for older, chronically ill veterans.108 
In the study conducted with the family members of dementia patients, the 
interviewer read to the participants the following statement about decision-making 
standards: 
 
Some people tell us that when they make healthcare decisions for their 
relative, they choose what they think their relative would have wanted. 
Other people tell us that when they make healthcare decisions for their 
relative they choose what is in their relative’s best interest. I’d like to 
find out which of these you use when you make healthcare decisions for 
your [relative]. Would you say you make decisions based on what he or 
she would have wanted or based on what is in his or her best interest?109 
 
After family members answered this initial question, they were asked follow-up 
questions to elicit further explanations of how they made decisions.110 Although 43 
percent of the surrogates claimed to use the substituted judgment standard and 57 
percent the best interest standard,111 the responses to follow-up questions revealed 
that only 7 percent used solely substituted judgment, 57 percent used best interest, 
and 37 percent used a combination of the standards.112 The reasons given for using 
both standards included: 1) there were no prior discussions about health care 
preferences; 2) unrealistic prior expectations of the patient; 3) the need for family 
consensus; 4) the need to consider the quality of life for the patient’s relatives; and 
5) the influence of health care professionals.113 
                                                     
105 See Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 75, at 996–98 (synthesizing the results of 
patient-surrogate studies and concluding that (1) surrogates who do not know a patient’s 
wishes often have difficulty predicting what the patient would want; (2) many surrogates 
refuse to make decisions consistent with known wishes; and (3) surrogates often 
mistakenly think they know a patient’s wishes). 
106 Id. at 997–98 (noting that a review of sixteen studies covering nearly 20,000 
patient-surrogate comparisons revealed only a 65 percent accuracy rate). 
107 Hirschman et al., supra note 13, at 660–61. 
108 Elizabeth K. Vig et al., Beyond Substituted Judgment: How Surrogates Navigate 
End-of-Life Decision-Making, 54 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1688, 1688–89 (2006). 
109 Hirschman et al., supra note 13, at 661 (alteration in original). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 663–64. 
112 Id. at 663. 
113 Id. at 665–66 (“Over half of the surrogates discussed the need for family consensus 
on decisions[,]” and many “struggled with the difference between who their relative is 
today (‘now self’) and who their relative was before the dementia (‘then self’).”). 
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In the study conducted with surrogate decision makers for chronically ill 
veterans, all interviewees had previously participated in a controlled trial to 
promote advance care planning.114 They were interviewed by telephone and asked 
to describe: 1) advance care planning conversations with the patient; 2) previous 
decision-making experiences with the patient; and 3) how they planned to make 
future health care decisions for the patient.115 Conversations with the surrogates 
revealed five bases for past and future decisions. These bases and the percentage of 
decision makers who applied them were: 1) conversations about the patient’s 
preferences (66 percent); 2) reliance on written documents—no conversation 
needed (10 percent); 3) shared values and life experience—conversations not 
necessarily needed (16 percent); 4) the surrogate’s own beliefs, values, and 
preferences (28 percent); and 5) seeking input from others in the surrogate’s 
network, including shared decision making with other family members, clergy, and 
clinicians (18 percent).116 
Although 66 percent of the surrogates for chronically ill veterans planned to 
make future decisions based on conversations with the patient, the interviews 
revealed that the content of such conversations was often vague.117 Other 
participants indicated that they did not need to rely on conversations because they 
“will ‘just know’ what to do based upon presumed shared values.”118 The 
surrogate’s values and beliefs also weighed heavily into the decision-making 
process.119 The researchers concluded that “[s]ubstituted judgment has a value in 
promoting patient autonomy during periods of decisional incapacity, but reliance 
on this standard neither recognizes the surrogate stakeholder’s interests nor fits 
with how many families make decisions.”120 
 
A.  Guardian Survey Design and Methodology 
 
We used the findings from the foregoing studies to arrive at a list of decision-
making factors for our Guardian Survey.121 The survey instructed respondent 
guardians to indicate how much each of the following factors influenced them 
when making decisions for an incapacitated person: 
 
 What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s best interest 
 What family members of the Incapacitated Person think is in the 
Incapacitated Person’s best interest 
 What professionals say is in the Incapacitated Person’s best interest 
                                                     
114 Vig et al., supra note 108, at 1689. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1690–91. 
117 Id. at 1690–92. 
118 Id. at 1691–92. 
119 Id. at 1692. 
120 Id. 
121 See National Guardianship Summit Guardian Survey, attached infra appendix. 
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 What will create harmony or consensus among the Incapacitated Person’s 
family members 
 What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s circumstances 
 What I think the Incapacitated Person would want122 
 
They indicated these rankings on a Likert scale (1 = not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = 
somewhat; 4 = quite a bit; 5 = a great deal; NA = not applicable).123 Two sets of 
rankings were possible—one for financial and property decisions and one for 
health care and personal decisions.124 
If the guardian indicated that “[w]hat I think the Incapacitated Person would 
want” was a factor in making decisions, then the guardian was asked to further 
identify all of the following factors that contributed to knowledge of what the 
incapacitated person would want: 
 
 Conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated 
 Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person 
 Written directions given by the person before he or she became 
incapacitated 
 What I know about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated Person 
 What others have told me about the values and preferences of the 
Incapacitated Person125 
 
To avoid predisposing respondents’ answers, the survey did not explicitly label 
decision-making factors as furthering substituted judgment or best interest, nor did 
it indicate which statutory standard was applicable in the respondent guardian’s 
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, three of the general decision-making factors on the 
survey included the words “best interest.”126 The phrase “what the incapacitated 
person would want” was used in lieu of “substituted judgment” as a means of 
testing whether guardians used substituted judgment when they made decisions for 
the incapacitated person.127 The goal of the survey was to ascertain what factors 
                                                     
122 See infra appendix. 
123 See infra appendix. An independent samples t-test was used to compare the means 
from the Likert scale to determine whether there were statistically significant differences in 
the responses of guardians from the best interest jurisdiction versus those from the hybrid 
jurisdictions and in the responses of family member guardians versus nonfamily member 
guardians. See infra notes 136–140, 148–150, 157–159, 167–169 and accompanying text. 
124 See infra appendix. 
125 See infra appendix. A chi-square significance test was used to compare the yes/no 
indications for these factors to determine whether there were statistically significant 
differences in the responses of guardians from the best interest jurisdiction versus those 
from the hybrid jurisdictions and in the responses of family member guardians versus 
nonfamily member guardians. See infra notes 143–147, 151–153, 162–166, 171–175 and 
accompanying text. 
126 See infra appendix. 
127 See infra appendix. 
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influence guardian decisions and then determine whether those factors differ 
depending on the jurisdiction’s statutory decision-making standard, the guardian’s 
status as a family member or nonfamily member, and the type of decision. 
Survey packets were distributed by volunteer attorneys who compiled mailing 
lists from their adult guardianship client files. They attached mailing labels to pre-
prepared survey packets, which included a self-addressed return envelope to permit 
mailing of the anonymous responses directly to the authors. In addition to the 
packets sent to private clients, Northern Indiana Adult Guardianship Services 
distributed packets to individuals who serve as guardians in their volunteer 
guardianship program. We were informed of the number of packets distributed in 
each jurisdiction, but did not have access to the recipients’ identities. 
 
B.  Survey Response Profile 
 
Of the 114 surveys distributed, 60 were returned, yielding a response rate of 
slightly over 50 percent. The four participating states represented two types of 
statutory decision-making standards—the best interest standard in Indiana128 
(forty-one surveys) and the hybrid substituted judgment/best interest standard 
(hybrid standard)129 in Georgia,130 Massachusetts,131 and South Dakota132 (nineteen 
total surveys). The ratio of surveys returned to surveys distributed was 
approximately 50 percent in each participating state.133 The number of family 
member versus nonfamily guardians was almost evenly split in the hybrid states 
(ten versus nine). In Indiana, the best interest state, almost twice as many family 
member guardians as nonfamily member guardians participated (twenty-seven 
versus fourteen). Of the twenty-three nonfamily member guardians who completed 
the survey, ten identified themselves as volunteers, six as court-appointed, five as 
professional guardians, and two as attorneys. 
Guardians were asked whether they knew the incapacitated person before they 
were appointed.134 Not surprising, most family member guardians knew the 
incapacitated person before appointment (thirty-five out of thirty-seven) and most 
                                                     
128 Indiana does not have an explicit statutory best interest standard, but does contain 
language in its statute indicating that “the guardian of an incapacitated person has, with 
respect to the incapacitated person, the same responsibilities as those of a guardian of a 
minor enumerated in subsection (a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(4) . . . .” IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-8-
1(b)(1) (West 2010). Subsection (a) of that section provides in part that the guardian of a 
minor has “all of the responsibilities and authority of a parent . . . .” Id. § 29-3-8-1(a); see 
supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the view that the duties of a 
parent are akin to duties under the best interest standard. 
129 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
130 GA. CODE ANN. § 29-4-22(a) (West 2007). 
131 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2011). 
132 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-402 (West 2004). 
133 The return ratios were as follows: Indiana (41/70), Georgia (6/10), Massachusetts 
(10/17), and South Dakota (3/7). 
134 See infra appendix. 
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nonfamily member guardians did not (twenty-one out of twenty-three). Given the 
strong correlation between family member status and prior knowledge of the 
incapacitated person, we did not do a separate analysis of results based on whether 
the guardian knew the incapacitated person before appointment. 
Guardians were also asked to indicate whether they had authority to make 
decisions about the finances or the property of the incapacitated person as well as 
whether they had authority to make decisions about the health care or person of the 
incapacitated individual.135 Not all guardians had authority to make both types of 
decisions. Of the sixty respondents, forty-seven had authority to make decisions 
about finances and property and fifty-four had authority to make decisions about 
health care and the person. 
 
C.  Survey Results and Analysis 
 
The following summary of results is organized first by type of decision—
financial/property or health care/personal. Then, for each type of decision, results 
are analyzed according to the decision-making standard in the guardian’s 
jurisdiction—best interest or hybrid, and whether the guardian respondent was a 
family member or nonfamily member. 
 
1.  Factors That Influence Financial and Property Decisions 
 
(a)  Best Interest Standard Versus Hybrid Standard 
 
Table F1 summarizes how guardians ranked the influence of various factors 
on financial and property decisions. The mean responses from guardians in the best 
interest jurisdiction (BI) are compared with the mean responses from guardians in 
the hybrid jurisdictions (SJ/BI). The two factors weighed most heavily by 
respondents from both jurisdictions were “What I think is in the Incapacitated 
Person’s best interest,”136 and “What I think the Incapacitated Person would 
want.”137 However, compared to guardians from the hybrid jurisdictions, guardians 
from the best interest jurisdiction gave significantly more weight to: 1) the views 
of family members,138 2) family harmony and consensus,139 and 3) what the 
                                                     
135 See infra appendix. 
136 Although guardians from both jurisdiction types gave this factor significant 
weight, guardians in the best interest jurisdiction ranked this factor significantly higher 
(5.00 ± 0) than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (4.44 ± 1.04) (t(17) = 2.26, p=.037). 
137 A significant majority of both groups responded that this factor influenced their 
decisions a great deal (BI 70%; SJ 65%). 
138 Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to 
consider what family members of the incapacitated person think is in the incapacitated 
person’s best interest (4.54 ± 1.10) than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (3.06 ± 1.16) 
(t(42) = 4.29, p<.001). 
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guardian would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances.140 Guardians 
from both jurisdictions gave similar weight to the opinions of professionals.141 
 
Table F1 
Influence of Factors on Financial and Property Decisions 
 
Factor  BI (Mean) SJ/BI (Mean) 
What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
5.00 4.44 
What family members of the Incapacitated 
Person think is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
4.54 3.06 
What professionals (such as accountants and 
investment advisors) say is in the Incapacitated 
Person’s best interest 
3.67 3.88 
What will create harmony or consensus among 
the Incapacitated Person’s family members 
3.91 2.56 
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s 
circumstances 
4.52 2.88 




                                                     
139 Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to 
consider what would create harmony and consensus among family members (3.91 ± 1.35) 
than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (2.56 ± 1.2) (t(39) = 3.36, p=.002). 
140 Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to 
consider what they would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances (4.52 ± .871) 
than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (2.88 ± 1.5) (t(22.5) = 4.12, p<.001). 
141 The difference between the mean rating by guardians in the best interest 
jurisdiction (3.67) and the mean rating by guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (3.88) was 
not statistically significant. 
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Table F2 summarizes what percentage of guardians from the best interest 
jurisdiction (BI) and what percentage from the hybrid jurisdictions (SJ/BI) 
considered each of the listed factors to determine what the incapacitated person 
would want. The majority of guardians in both jurisdictions did not consider 
conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated,142 or prior 
written directions.143 Although the majority of respondents did not consider prior 
written directions, a significantly greater percentage of guardians from the hybrid 
jurisdictions indicated that they did.144 A majority of guardians from both 
jurisdictions considered what they knew about the values and preferences of the 
incapacitated person.145 But a significantly greater percentage of guardians from 
the hybrid jurisdictions used current conversations with the incapacitated person146 
and what others told them about the values and preferences of the incapacitated 
person147 when assessing what the incapacitated person would want. 
                                                     
142 The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction 
who did not consider conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated 
(71 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who did not 
consider such conversations (61 percent) was not statistically significant. 
143 Although the majority of guardians in both jurisdiction types did not consider prior 
written directions, guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions were significantly more likely to 
consider prior written directions than guardians in the best interest jurisdiction (X2 = 4.68, 
df=1, p=.03). 
144 See supra note 143. 
145 The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction 
who considered what they knew about the values and preferences of the incapacitated 
person (81 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who 
considered this factor (89 percent) was not statistically significant. 
146 Guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions were significantly more likely to consider 
current conversations with the incapacitated person than guardians in the best interest 
jurisdiction (X2 = 5.86, df=1, p=.016). 
147 Guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions were significantly more likely to consider 
what others told them about the values and preferences of the incapacitated person than 
guardians in the best interest jurisdiction (X2=3.02, df=1, p=.082). 
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Table F2 
Factors that Helped the Guardian Know What 
 the Incapacitated Person Would Want  






Conversations with the person before he or she became 
incapacitated 
29 39 
Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person 48 83 
Written directions given by the person before he or she 
became incapacitated 
16 44 
What the Guardian knows about the values and 
preferences of the Incapacitated Person 
81 89 
What others have told the Guardian about the values and 
preferences of the Incapacitated Person 
36 61 
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(b)  Family Member Guardians Versus Nonfamily Member Guardians 
 
Table F3 summarizes how family member guardians (FAM) versus nonfamily 
member guardians (NON) ranked the influence of various factors on financial and 
property decisions. Perhaps not surprising, family member guardians weighed 
much more heavily than nonfamily guardians: 1) the views of family members,148 
2) family harmony and consensus,149 and 3) what the guardian would want in the 
incapacitated person’s circumstances.150  
 
Table F3 
Influence of Factors on Financial and Property Decisions 
 
Factor FAM (Mean) NON (Mean) 
What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
4.94 4.43 
What family members of the Incapacitated 
Person think is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
4.27 2.91 
What professionals (such as accountants and 
investment advisors) say is in the Incapacitated 
Person’s best interest 
3.61 4.08 
What will create harmony or consensus among 
the Incapacitated Person’s family members 
3.73 2.18 
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s 
circumstances 
4.52 2.38 




                                                     
148 Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what family 
members of the incapacitated person think is in the incapacitated person’s best interest 
(4.27 ± 1.28) than nonfamily member guardians (2.91 ± .94) (t(42) = 3.24, p=.002). 
149 Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what will 
create harmony or consensus in the family (3.73 ± 1.34) than nonfamily member guardians 
(2.18 ± 1.08) (t(39) = 3.45, p=.001). 
150 Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what they 
would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances (4.52 ± .83) than nonfamily 
members (2.38 ± 1.33) (t(15.89) = 5.39, p<.001). 
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Table F4 summarizes what percentage of family member guardians (FAM) 
and what percentage of nonfamily member guardians (NON) considered each of 
the listed factors to determine what the incapacitated person would want. Three 
factors were considered more frequently by nonfamily member guardians when 
making financial or property decisions: 1) prior written directions,151 2) current 
conversations,152 and 3) what others told the guardian about the values and 
preferences of the incapacitated person.153 
 
Table F4 
Factors that Helped the Guardian Know  
What the Incapacitated Person Would Want 






Conversations with the person before he or she became 
incapacitated 
34 29 
Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person 51 86 
Written directions given by the person before he or she 
became incapacitated 
14 57 
What the Guardian knows about the values and 
preferences of the Incapacitated Person 
83 86 
What others have told the Guardian about the values 
and preferences of the Incapacitated Person 
29 86 
 
                                                     
151 Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider the 
incapacitated person’s prior written directions than family member guardians (X2 = 9.42, 
df=1, p=.002). 
152 Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider current 
conversations with the incapacitated person than family member guardians (X2 = 4.95, 
df=1, p=.026). 
153 Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what 
others have told them about the incapacitated person than family member guardians (X2 = 
13.2, df=1, p<.001). 
1526 UTAH LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3 
2.  Factors That Influence Health Care and Personal Decisions 
 
(a)  Best Interest Standard Versus Hybrid Standard 
 
Table H1 summarizes how guardians ranked the influence of various factors 
on health care and personal decisions. The mean responses from guardians in the 
best interest jurisdiction (BI) are compared with the mean responses from 
guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (SJ/BI). The comparison between responses 
from the two types of jurisdictions is almost identical to the comparison of 
responses for financial and property decisions.154 The two factors weighed most 
heavily by respondents from both jurisdictions were “What I think is in the 
Incapacitated Person’s best interest,”155 and “What I think the Incapacitated Person 
would want.”156 Guardians from the best interest jurisdiction gave significantly 
more weight than did guardians from the hybrid jurisdictions to: 1) the views of 
family members,157 2) family harmony and consensus,158 and 3) what the guardian 
would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances.159 Guardians from both 
jurisdictions gave similar weight to the opinions of professionals.160 Of note, the 
mean weight given to the opinions of professionals was higher in both jurisdictions 
for decisions about the health care and person of the incapacitated individual than 
for financial and property decisions.161 
                                                     
154 See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text. 
155 The difference between the mean rating by guardians in the best interest 
jurisdiction (4.84) and the mean rating by guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (4.28) was 
not statistically significant. 
156 The difference between the mean rating by guardians in the best interest 
jurisdiction (4.53) and the mean rating by guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (4.83) was 
not statistically significant. 
157 Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to 
consider what family members of the incapacitated person think is in the incapacitated 
person’s best interest (4.20 ± 1.22) than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (3.17 ± 1.34) 
(t(46) = 2.75, p=.009). 
158 Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction were significantly more likely to 
consider what would create harmony and consensus among the family members of the 
incapacitated person (3.68 ± 1.42) than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (2.28 ± 1.27) 
(t(44) = 3.40, p=.001). 
159 Guardians in the best interest jurisdictions were significantly more likely to 
consider what they would want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances (4.24 ± 1.36) 
than guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (3.24 ± 1.56) (t(53) = 2.41, p=.02). 
160 The difference between the mean rating by guardians in the best interest 
jurisdiction (4.58) and the mean rating by guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions (4.22) was 
not statistically significant. 
161 Guardians in the best interest jurisdictions gave the views of professionals a mean 
rating of 4.58 for health and personal decisions as compared to a mean rating of 3.67 for 
financial and property decisions. Guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions gave the views of 
professionals a mean rating of 4.22 for health and personal decisions and a mean rating of 
3.88 for financial and property decisions.  
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Table H1 
Influence of Factors on Health Care and Personal Decisions 
 
Factor BI (Mean) SJ/BI (Mean) 
What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
4.84 4.28 
What family members of the Incapacitated 
Person think is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
4.20 3.17 
What professionals (such as doctors and 
caregivers) say is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
4.58 4.22 
What will create harmony or consensus among 
the Incapacitated Person’s family members 
3.68 2.28 
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s 
circumstances 
4.24 3.24 
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Table H2 summarizes what percentage of guardians from the best interest 
jurisdiction (BI) and what percentage from the hybrid jurisdictions (SJ/BI) 
considered each of the listed factors to determine what the incapacitated person 
would want. The majority of guardians in both jurisdictions did not consider 
conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated.162 The 
majority in the best interest jurisdiction also did not consider prior written 
directions, while the guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions were evenly split on 
whether they relied on prior written directions.163 A majority of guardians in both 
jurisdictions relied on current conversations with the incapacitated person164 and 
on what they knew about the values and preferences of the incapacitated person.165 
Approximately half of the guardians from each type of jurisdiction also relied on 
what others told them about the values and preferences of the incapacitated 
person.166 
                                                     
162 The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction 
who did not consider conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated 
(76 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who did not 
consider such conversations (61percent) was not statistically significant. 
163 Guardians in hybrid jurisdictions were significantly more likely to consider prior 
written directions than guardians in the best interest jurisdiction (X2=5.97, df=1, p=.015). 
164 The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction 
who considered current conversations with the incapacitated person (58 percent) and the 
percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who considered current conversations 
(78%) was not statistically significant. 
165 The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction 
who considered what they knew about the values and preferences of the incapacitated 
person (71 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions who 
considered this factor (89 percent) was not statistically significant. 
166 The difference between the percentage of guardians in the best interest jurisdiction 
who considered what others told them about the values and preferences of the incapacitated 
person (47 percent) and the percentage of guardians in the hybrid jurisdiction who 
considered this factor (50 percent) was not statistically significant. 
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Table H2 
Factors That Helped the Guardian Know  
What the Incapacitated Person Would Want 






Conversations with the person before he or she became 
incapacitated 
24 39 
Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person 58 78 
Written directions given by the person before he or she 
became incapacitated 
18 50 
What the Guardian knows about the values and 
preferences of the Incapacitated Person 
71 89 
What others have told the Guardian about the values and 
preferences of the Incapacitated Person 
47 50 
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(b)  Family Member Guardians Versus Nonfamily Member Guardians 
 
Table H3 summarizes how family member guardians (FAM) versus 
nonfamily member guardians (NON) ranked the influence of various factors on 
health care and personal decisions. The comparison between responses from the 
family member and nonfamily member guardians is almost identical to the 
comparison of responses for financial and property decisions. Family member 
guardians who made decisions about the health care or person of an incapacitated 
individual weighed more heavily than nonfamily guardians: 1) the views of family 
members,167 2) family harmony and consensus,168 and 3) what the guardian would 
want in the incapacitated person’s circumstances.169 
 
Table H3 
Influence of Factors on Health Care and Personal Decisions 
 
Factor FAM (Mean) NON (Mean) 
What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
4.91 4.24 
What family members of the Incapacitated 
Person think is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
4.06 3.27 
What professionals (such as doctors and 
caregivers) say is in the Incapacitated Person’s 
best interest 
4.54 4.33 
What will create harmony or consensus among 
the Incapacitated Person’s family members 
3.56 2.14 
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s 
circumstances 
4.49 2.95 




                                                     
167 Family member guardians were moderately more likely to consider what family 
members of the incapacitated person think is in the incapacitated person’s best interest 
(4.06 ± 1.37) than nonfamily member guardians (3.27 ± 1.16) (t(46) = 1.95, p=.058). 
168 Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what will 
create harmony or consensus in the family (3.56 ± 1.52) than nonfamily member guardians 
(2.14 ± .95) (t(38.36) = 3.84, p<.001). 
169 Family member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what they 
would want in the same circumstances (4.49 ± .92) than nonfamily member guardians (2.95 
± 1.79) (t(24.84) = 3.58, p=.001). 
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Table H4 summarizes what percentage of family member guardians (FAM) 
and what percentage of nonfamily member guardians (NON) considered each of 
the listed factors to determine what the incapacitated person would want. The same 
three factors were considered more often by nonfamily guardians in the context of 
health care and personal decisions as were considered by those guardians in the 
context of financial and property decisions:170 1) prior written directions,171 2) 
current conversations,172 and 3) what others told the guardian about the values and 
preferences of the incapacitated person.173 The majority of both types of guardians 
did not rely on past conversations,174 but did rely on what they knew of the values 
and preferences of the incapacitated person.175 
 
Table H4 
Factors That Helped the Guardian Know What the  
Incapacitated Person Would Want 






Conversations with the person before he or she became 
incapacitated 
31 24 
Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person 51 86 
Written directions given by the person before he or she 
became incapacitated 
14 52 
What the Guardian knows about the values and 
preferences of the Incapacitated Person 
77 76 
What others have told the Guardian about the values 
and preferences of the Incapacitated Person 
29 81 
                                                     
170 See supra notes 151–153 and accompanying text. 
171 Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider the 
incapacitated person’s written directions than family member guardians (X2 = 9.33, df=1, 
p=.002). 
172 Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider current 
conversations with the incapacitated person than family member guardians (X2 = 6.725, 
df=1, p=.01). 
173 Nonfamily member guardians were significantly more likely to consider what 
others have told them about the incapacitated person than family member guardians 
(X2 = 14.42, df=1, p<.001). 
174 The difference between the percentage of family member guardians who did not 
consider conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated (69 percent) 
and the percentage of nonfamily member guardians who did not consider such 
conversations (76 percent) was not statistically significant. 
175 The difference between the percentage of family member guardians who did rely 
on what they knew of the values and preferences of the incapacitated person (77 percent) 
and the percentage of nonfamily member guardians who relied on this factor (76 percent) 
was not statistically significant. 
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D.  Survey Conclusions 
 
The National Guardianship Summit Guardian Survey was an exploratory 
study. To our knowledge, it was the first to investigate what factors influence how 
guardians make decisions. Specifically, we gathered data to determine whether the 
decision-making standard, the family status of the guardian, and the type of 
decision make a difference in the decision-making process. While our sample size 
was modest—sixty guardians—the results, as analyzed under both an independent 
samples t-test and a chi-square significance test, yielded statistically significant 
results. The following conclusions summarize these findings. Further research is 
warranted to ascertain whether these results will be replicated in another sample 
and also to investigate what other factors might be material to the surrogate 
decision-making process. 
 
1.  Decision-Making Standard 
 
The survey results suggest that the statutory decision-making standard in a 
jurisdiction does influence how guardians make decisions. While all guardians 
indicated that they give significant consideration to what they think is in the 
incapacitated person’s best interest and what they think the incapacitated person 
would want, the relative importance of various decision-making factors and the 
bases for determining what an incapacitated person would want differed 
significantly with the type of jurisdiction. Guardians in the best interest 
jurisdiction, for all types of decisions, gave more weight to the views of family 
members, family harmony and consensus, and what the guardian would want in the 
incapacitated person’s circumstances. For financial and property decisions, 
guardians from the hybrid jurisdictions were more likely than guardians from the 
best interest jurisdiction to rely on current conversations with the incapacitated 
person and on what others told them about the incapacitated person’s values and 
preferences. 
The differences based on jurisdiction were less in the context of health care 
and personal decisions. The majority of guardians in both jurisdictions relied on 
current conversations with the incapacitated person and on what they knew about 
the values and preferences of the incapacitated person to determine what the 
incapacitated person would want. Approximately half of the guardians in both 
jurisdictions also relied on what others told them about the values and preferences 
of the incapacitated person. While all guardians looked at similar factors to 
determine what the incapacitated person would want, the guardians in the best 
interest jurisdiction also gave significant weight to the views of family members, 
family harmony and consensus, and what the guardian would want in the 
incapacitated person’s circumstances. 
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2.  Family-Member Status of Guardian 
 
The survey results suggest that the status of the guardian—family member or 
nonfamily member—influences how guardians make decisions. For both types of 
decisions—financial/property and health care/personal—family member guardians 
gave greater weight to the views of family members, family harmony and 
consensus, and what the guardian would want in the incapacitated person’s 
circumstances. With respect to factors used to determine what the incapacitated 
person would want—in other words, factors used to form a substituted judgment—
nonfamily member guardians more often considered prior written directions, 
current conversations, and what others told them about the values and preferences 
of the incapacitated person. 
 
E.  Reality and Theory 
 
Results from the National Guardianship Summit Guardian Survey suggest a 
number of preliminary conclusions about the five theoretical models for guardian 
decisions. First, it is unlikely that guardians make decisions using either a strict 
best interest or a strict substituted judgment model. Nearly all respondents 
indicated that when they make surrogate decisions they considered both the 
incapacitated person’s best interest and what the incapacitated person would want. 
Second, while guardians from the best interest jurisdiction claimed to consider 
what the incapacitated person would want, they, more than guardians from the 
hybrid jurisdictions, rated as influential survey factors that were linked to best 
interest. Guardians in the best interest jurisdiction as well as family member 
guardians were more likely to give weight to the views of family members, family 
harmony and consensus, and what the guardians projected the incapacitated person 
would want in the circumstances. Such considerations reflect what could be 
understood as expanded best interest—taking into account consequences for 
significant others that the incapacitated person likely would have considered. 
Beyond expanded best interest notions, this approach might also be understood as 
the most protective, as it seeks the broadest range of opinion about what is best for 
the incapacitated person. On the other hand, consideration of family harmony and 
consensus, without safeguards, could lead to decisions that favor family members 
to the detriment of the incapacitated person. Without a clear statutory standard, an 
almost infinite range of possibilities exist for how a guardian might make a 
decision under an expanded notion of best interest. 
Third, although guardians from both jurisdictions favored using substituted 
judgment at least in part, the survey responses do not provide much of an 
explanation for how guardians in the best interest jurisdiction planned to determine 
what the incapacitated person would want. Most of these guardians appeared to use 
an expanded notion of substituted judgment based on what the guardian knew 
about the values and preferences of the incapacitated person; however, the source 
of this knowledge was unclear. Less than half of the guardians used current 
conversations with the incapacitated person, and an even smaller percentage 
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considered past conversations, written directions, and what others told the guardian 
about the incapacitated person’s values and preferences. These results are similar 
to those found in the study conducted with surrogates for chronically ill 
veterans.176 In that study, many of the surrogates presumed to know what the 
incapacitated person would want but based the belief on factors such as presumed 
shared values, vague conversations, and the surrogate’s own values, beliefs, and 
preferences rather than on direct evidence of the incapacitated person’s desires.177 
Fourth, guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions, when making decisions, 
appeared to consider some combination of substituted judgment and best interest 
factors. The relative importance of substituted judgment appeared greater in the 
hybrid jurisdictions than in the best interest jurisdiction, as evidenced by more 
guardian reliance on current conversations, the guardian’s knowledge of the 
incapacitated person’s values and preferences, and what others told the guardian 
about the incapacitated person’s values and preferences. In addition, written 
directions were used by 44 percent of the guardians for financial and property 
decisions and by 50 percent of the guardians for health care decisions. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Guardians have little statutory or case law to guide them on how to make 
decisions for incapacitated persons. The majority of jurisdictions have no 
articulated decision-making standard for non–health care decisions but most likely 
follow a general custom of “best interest.” Fourteen jurisdictions have adopted a 
combination of substituted judgment and best interest standards, but most fail to 
clarify for guardians the manner in which these standards should be applied. 
Theories about the use of substituted judgment and best interest range from a 
strict substituted judgment approach, which requires that decisions follow the 
incapacitated person’s prior directions, to a strict best interest approach, which 
dictates that decision makers may only consider actions that will promote the 
incapacitated person’s welfare. The Uniform Act language and the National 
Guardianship Association (NGA) standard represent hybrid approaches; each 
recognizes that often no information exists upon which to base a true substituted 
judgment and that a true substituted judgment, when possible, might sometimes be 
harmful to the incapacitated person. 
Empirical research conducted in best interest and hybrid substituted 
judgment/best interest jurisdictions revealed that nearly all guardians attempt to 
consider both standards when they make decisions for an incapacitated person. 
Survey results, however, showed that guardians in a best interest jurisdiction 
tended to favor decision-making factors related to best interest, such as the views 
of family members and what the guardian would want in the incapacitated person’s 
circumstances, and that guardians in the hybrid jurisdictions tended to rely more on 
decision-making factors related to substituted judgment, such as current 
                                                     
176 See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text. 
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conversations with the incapacitated person and what others had told the guardian 
about the incapacitated person’s values and preferences. This research suggests 
that 1) most guardians use some blend of best interest and substituted judgment 
standards when they make decisions; 2) statutory decision-making standards 
influence the way guardians make decisions; and 3) law reform is needed to create 
statutory standards that provide adequate guidance for guardians. Further empirical 
research is warranted to determine whether these findings will be replicated and to 
investigate what other factors may be material to the surrogate decision-making 
process. Such research would be beneficial both to law reform efforts and 
development of guardian best practices. 
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NATIONAL GUARDIANSHIP SUMMIT 
GUARDIAN SURVEY 
  
Thank you for completing this survey about how you make decisions as a 
Guardian. Please check or circle (where indicated) your responses and return the 
completed survey by May 31, 2011. 
 
Note: If you are currently serving (or have served) as Guardian for more than 
one Incapacitated Person, please base your answers on the most recent 
Guardianship appointment.  
 
1. I am:  
 currently serving as a Guardian. 
 no longer a Guardian but have served as one in the past. 
 
2. Please select the capacity in which you are (were) serving as a Guardian: 
   Family member 
   Non-family member volunteer 
 Other: ____________________________________________ 
(If “Other,” please indicate in what capacity you came to be appointed as a 
Guardian—e.g., professional guardian, public guardian, attorney or social 
worker appointed by the court, etc.) 
 
3. Did you know the Incapacitated Person before you were appointed to serve as 
Guardian?  
 Yes  No 
 
If “Yes,” how long did you know the Incapacitated Person before appointment? 
   Less than 60 days 
 60 days to 1 year 
 Over 1 year 
 
4. Please indicate all types of decisions you have (had) authority to make as a 
Guardian: 
 Decisions about the finances or property of the Incapacitated 
Person 
 Decisions about the health care or person of the Incapacitated 
Person 
 
5. Did you receive instructions from the court or anyone else about what factors 
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IF you make FINANCIAL or PROPERTY decisions for the Incapacitated 
Person . . .  
 
(If you do not make these decisions, please skip to question #7). 
 
6. How much does (did) each of the following influence you when making financial or 
property decisions for the Incapacitated Person? 
 
1 = not at all 2 = a little  3 = somewhat 4 = quite a bit 
5 = a great deal    NA = not applicable 
 
What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s best 
interest 1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What family members of the Incapacitated Person think 
is in the Incapacitated Person’s best interest  1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What professionals (such as accountants and investment 
advisors) say is in the Incapacitated Person’s best 
interest  
1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What will create harmony or consensus among the 
Incapacitated Person’s family members  1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s 
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What I think the Incapacitated Person would want 1 2 3 4 5 NA 
 
 
 6a. If “what you think the Incapacitated Person would want” is one of 
your considerations, please indicate which of the following factors have 
helped you to know what the Incapacitated Person would want (Check 
all that apply): 
 
  Conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated 
  Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person 
  Written directions given by the person before he or she became 
incapacitated 
  What I know about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated 
Person 
  What others have told me about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated 
Person 
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IF you make HEALTH CARE or PERSONAL decisions for the Incapacitated 
Person . . .  
 
(If you do not make these decisions, please skip to question #8). 
 
7. How much does (did) each of the following influence you when making health care or 
personal decisions for the Incapacitated Person? 
 
1 = not at all 2 = a little  3 = somewhat 4 = quite a bit 
5 = a great deal    NA = not applicable 
 
What I think is in the Incapacitated Person’s best 
interest 1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What family members of the Incapacitated Person think 
is in the Incapacitated Person’s best interest  1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What professionals (such as accountants and investment 
advisors) say is in the Incapacitated Person’s best 
interest  
1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What will create harmony or consensus among the 
Incapacitated Person’s family members  1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What I would want in the Incapacitated Person’s 
circumstances 1 2 3 4 5 NA 
What I think the Incapacitated Person would want 1 2 3 4 5 NA 
 
 
 7a. If “what you think the Incapacitated Person would want” is one of 
your considerations, please indicate which of the following factors have 
helped you to know what the Incapacitated Person would want (Check 
all that apply): 
 
  Conversations with the person before he or she became incapacitated 
  Current conversations with the Incapacitated Person 
  Written directions given by the person before he or she became 
incapacitated 
  What I know about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated 
Person 
  What others have told me about the values and preferences of the Incapacitated 
Person 
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8. Please tell us a little about yourself: 
 
Gender:  Male  Female   
 
Age:   18–29   30–49  50–69  70 or older 
 
Please choose the race or ethnicity that best applies to you: 
 
  African American/Black 
  White, not Hispanic 
  Native American 
  Latino/Hispanic 
  Asia 
  Arab 
  Other_____________________ 
 
How long you have served as a Guardian?: 
 
 Less than 1 year 
 1-3 years 
 Over 3 years 
 
9. Please feel free to share other factors that you consider when you make 









Thank you for your participation! 
Return survey in the envelope provided, or mail to: 
  Professor Linda S. Whitton   
  Valparaiso University 
  School of Law  
  Valparaiso, Indiana 
   
For more information please email: linda.whitton@valpo.edu 
